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ABSTRACT
The business and academic worlds agree that team resilience and team adaptation are in
increasing need of study. This study explores the behavioral processes of team adaptation—
specifically, those action phase and interpersonal processes mapped by Marks, Mathieu, and
Zaccaro (2001) and overlapping with the team adaptation model by Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce,
and Kendall (2006) and expanded by Rosen et al. (2011). Additionally, the impact of trigger type
on adaptive behaviors is explored as suggested by Maynard and Kennedy (2016). These
explorations are conducted within the context of extreme teams, and the primary method used is
Crayne and Hunter’s (2018) historiometric analysis (HMA). The chosen sources include crew
diaries and new articles detailing the events of the 2014-2015 Volvo Ocean. Critical incidents are
pulled from these sources and coded for trigger type as either taskwork- or teamwork-focused,
and the adaptive behaviors in response to these triggers are coded in a bottom up, emergent
process. The data is reported as rank-ordered frequencies. Results suggest that resilient teams
engage in some of those processes suggested by the Marks et al. (2001) framework—
coordination, monitoring, communication, and backup—as well as other adaptive behavioral
processes. Furthermore, taskwork-focused triggers are seen as resulting in more action phase
behavioral adaptation processes, though limited data is found to speak to the mechanisms of
teamwork-focused triggers. Future research directions are suggested to include examination of
teams of various levels of expertise in both taskwork-specific and generalized teamwork skills.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1973, the Volvo Ocean Race has seen elite sailors compete in what has been called
“the ultimate test of a team” (VolvoOceanRacing.com). Every four or so years, six to eight teams
of up to 11 of the world’s most skilled sailors from all over the world race around the globe for a
total distance of approximately 40,000 nautical miles. They work 24 hours a day, sleeping in
four-hour shifts, for approximately nine months, split into eight or nine legs between 10 and 35
days long. The teams face all the challenges that the oceans have to offer—including sudden,
unforeseeable changes in weather patterns, extreme heat and cold, tumultuous waves, and
infuriating stillness—as well as all the interpersonal challenges that come with being an
essentially isolated team working against the clock in competition against equals. No prize
money is given to winners; victory over such a feat serves as its own reward for these teams.
These races represent the most elite sailing teams facing extreme conditions and
emerging resilience in the face of life threatening challenges. Building to exactly what these
teams are begins with one of the most commonly accepted definitions of a team, which comes
from Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006):
(a) two or more individuals who; (b) socially interact (face-to-face or, increasingly,
virtually); (c) possess one or more common goals; (d) are brought together to perform
organizationally relevant tasks; (e) exhibit interdependencies with respect to workflow,
goals, and outcomes; (f) have different roles and responsibilities; and (g) are together
embedded in an encompassing organizational system, with boundaries and linkages to the
broader system (p. 79)
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In a recent study exploring the mechanisms of leadership in extreme teams, Burke,
Shuffler, and Wiese (2018) describe long-duration sailboat racing as an extreme environment in
which teams operation under conditions of high unpredictability, confinement, and both
magnitude and probability of severe consequences of error. As such, it is accepted that these
teams are, in fact, extreme teams, as defined by Bell, Fisher, Brown, and Mann (2016):
(a) complete their tasks in performance environments with one or more contextual
features that are atypical in level (e.g., extreme time pressure) or kind (e.g., confinement,
danger) and (b) for which ineffective performance has serious consequences (p. 2)
Finally, given the complex, dynamic environments that extreme teams operate within and
the many stressors they face, literature notes that adaptation and resilience play a key role in
effective team performance (e.g. Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006). Team resilience
has been defined by Alliger, Cerasoli, Tannenbaum, & Vessey (2015, p. 176) as “the capacity of
a team to withstand and overcome stressors in a manner that enables sustained performance.”
Likewise, team adaptability has been defined by Maynard, Kennedy, and Sommer (2015, p. 655)
as “the capacity of a team to make needed changes in response to a disruption or trigger.”
While the examples above are presented within the context of ocean racing, the need for
teams to be resilient under challenging conditions are not unique to this community. As evidence
of this, key research organizations, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), international consulting firm, Accenture (Kennedy, Landon, & Maynard, 2016), and
US military organizations (Boermans, Delahaij, Korteling, & Euwema, 2012), are asking about
how to help teams become more resilient. Published research echoes this call for analysis of
resilience at the team level (Kennedy et al., 2016; King, Newman, & Luthans, 2016; Bowers,
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Kreutzer, Cannon-Bowers, & Lamb, 2017). Researchers are just beginning to explore resilience
at the team level. Three theoretical models have been presented in recent years (Alliger et al.,
2015; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Bowers et al., 2017) in an effort to understand the nature and
mechanisms of team resilience, yet empirical research has lagged behind. Therefore, based on
these models detailed below, the current research serves to begin to answer calls for by exploring
adaptive behavioral processes that lead to team resilience using historiometric analysis.

3

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Nature of Team Resilience
One of the first conceptualizations of team resilience comes from Alliger et al. (2015).
They define team resilience as a buildable capacity: “the capacity of a team to withstand and
overcome stressors in a manner that enables sustained performance,” (p. 176) as well as “helps
teams handle and bounce back from challenges that can endanger their cohesiveness and
performance” (p. 177). In an intervention-focused exploration of team resilience, Alliger et al.
(2015) describe the challenges faced by teams and compare behavioral markers of resilient
versus non-resilient teams. They emphasize that team resilience is only visible when challenges
occur, and though their overview is not built into a model, they detail those actions that resilient
teams take to minimize, manage, and mend when facing a challenge.
Similarly, a second model by Sharma and Sharma (2016) defines team resilience as an
ability: “the ability of the teams/groups to bounce back and sustain in the facade of adverse
conditions” (p. 37). Their study reviews measures of individual-level resilience and develops a
new measure specific to team resilience based on this conceptualization. Their hierarchical,
multidimensional model considers team resilience as a result of underlying processes and grouplevel attributes, which include mastery approaches, group structure, social capital, and collective
efficacy.
Bowers et al. (2017) expand the theoretical understanding of team resilience by placing it
within an IMOI model and delineating the interrelated processes and emergent states.
Specifically, this model slots team resilience as a second-order emergent state—that is, a result
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of first-order emergent state(s), which results from process(es), which results from input
factor(s). In this context, team resilience is described as a buildable capacity that facilitates
performance rebound in the face of challenges. Bowers et al.’s (2017) developed model includes
the inputs, processes, and emergent states that research indicates enable team resilience at three
levels—individual, team and organizational. Of most interest to this study is adaptability, which
they have slotted as team level emergent state.
Some theoretical overlap exists between these models. Specifically, the given definitions
of team resilience are, by and large, in agreement as to the following two components: sustaining
(Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Alliger et al., 2015) and recovering, rebounding, or bouncing back
performance levels in the face of adversity (Alliger et al., 2015; Sharma & Sharma, 2016;
Bowers et al., 2017). Furthermore, Alliger et al. (2015) and Bowers et al. (2017) agree on two
key points: first, that team-level resilience is distinct from individual resilience and, second, that
a team comprised of resilient members does not necessarily make a resilient team. Alliger et al.
(2015, p. 177) further explain: “team members who are high in both ability and psychological
‘hardiness’ may, perhaps precisely because of their past solo successes, operate with less regard
for other team members or the team.” These statements are particularly important, because they
indicate that the study and training of individual resilience is not sufficient to ensure successful
performance in the face of adversity for teams.
This leads to the question: if individual resilience does not necessarily lead to team
resilience, what does? As a final point of agreement, each of the described studies calls for
further exploration of the construct of team resilience and how it relates to team processes.
Building upon the models detailed above, this research seeks to answer these calls and explore
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the relationships between team resilience and the behavioral processes of team adaptation.
Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following driving research questions:
1. What behavioral processes are engaged in by extreme teams where adaptation and
resilience are factors?
2. Does the nature of the trigger change the behavioral processes of adaptation?
For the purposes of this study, team resilience is defined based on Bowers et al.’s (2017)
description of resilient teams as those who thrive, rebound, and/or positively adapt to adversity
and are, therefore, less likely to experience inhibiting effects of challenges faced. The
components of recovering, sustaining, and possibly gaining in performance levels (Alliger et al.,
2015; Sharma & Sharma, 2016; Bowers et al., 2017) are accepted and explored within the
context of visible challenges faced by extreme teams. In response to these studies and calls for
future exploration and to answer the driving research questions of this study, a qualitative study
is conducted using historiometric analysis of extreme teams in long duration ocean racing events.
The hypotheses in answer to the driving research questions are outlined below.
The Behavioral Processes of Team Adaptation
Literature has already begun to connect the constructs of team adaptability and team
resilience, most recently in Bowers et al.’s (2017) model described above. As expected, the
relationship between the two constructs at the team level is close and complex. Burke et al.
(2006) present a conceptual analysis and model of the intricacies of team adaptation and define it
as follows (p. 1189-1190):
Team adaptation is defined herein as a change in team performance, in response to a
salient cue or cue stream that leads to a functional outcome for the entire team. Team adaptation
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is manifested in the innovation of new or modification of existing structures, capacities, and/or
behavioral or cognitive goal-directed actions.
Further, Maynard and Kennedy (2016) parse out distinctions between team adaptive
outcomes, team adaptability, and team adaptation process. Team adaptive outcomes are defined,
naturally, as consequences of the adaptation process and are suggested to include emergent states
and affective reactions (Maynard & Kennedy, 2016). The model proposed by Bowers et al.
(2017) suggests that team resilience is an emergent state that is, in part, a byproduct of the team
engaging in adaptive behaviors. As previously discussed, team adaptability is “the capacity of a
team to make needed changes in response to a disruption or trigger” (Maynard et al., 2015, p.
655). Finally and most significantly, team adaptation process is defined as “adjustments to
relevant team processes (i.e. action, interpersonal, transition) in response to the disruption or
trigger giving rise to the need for adaptation” (Maynard et al., 2015, p. 656).
In building to this concept of team adaptation, Maynard and Kennedy (2016) build upon
the taxonomy of team process phases developed by Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001), as well
as the model of the adaptive team performance cycle developed by Burke et al. (2006), which
was later expanded by Rosen et al. (2011) to include specific behavioral markers for each phase
of the adaptive process. The contributions by each are outlined below.
In an early review, Marks et al. (2001) develop a taxonomy of team processes as
subdivided into 3 categories: transition, action, and interpersonal. First, transition phase
processes are those in which “teams focus primarily on evaluation and/or planning activities to
guide their accomplishment of a team goal or objective” and include the sub-processes of
mission analysis, goal specification, and strategy formulation (Marks et al., 2001, p. 360). Next,
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action phase processes are those in which “teams are engaged in acts that contribute directly to
goal accomplishment (i.e., taskwork)” and include the sub-processes of monitoring progress
toward goals, systems monitoring, team monitoring and backup, and coordination (Marks et al.,
2001, p. 360). Finally, interpersonal processes are those in which teams “manage interpersonal
relationships” and “govern interpersonal activities” (Marks et al., 2001, p. 368). These processes
occur throughout both transition and action phases, and they include the sub-processes of conflict
management, motivating and confidence building, and affect management. For a figure depicting
this model, see Appendix A. Though these phases and process are not discussed specifically in
terms of adaptation or resilience, they are described as mechanisms by which teams achieve
effective performance.
Much of Marks et al.’s (2001) framework is echoed in Burke et al.’s (2006) model,
though theirs is much more refined to the specifics of team adaptation. Rosen et al.’s (2011)
expansion only furthers this. That said, Burke et al. (2006) conceptualize team adaptation as a
process comprised for four cyclical phases. First is situation assessment, which consists of cue
recognition and meaning ascription. Rosen et al. (2011) add team communication. The second is
plan formulation, to which Rosen et al. (2011) add the sub-processes of mission analysis; goal
specification; strategy formulation, which consists of deliberate planning and contingency
planning; role differentiation; and preemptive conflict management. The third phase is plan
execution, consisting of coordination, which then consists of mutual monitoring, communication,
backup behavior, and leadership. Rosen et al. (2011) do not include leadership, but add systems
monitoring, reactive strategy planning (another component of strategy formulation from the plan
formulation phase), reactive conflict management, and affect management. Finally, the fourth
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phase is team learning, to which Rosen et al. (2011) add the sub-processes of recap, which
consists of information search and structuring and events review, and reflection / critique, which
consists of active listening, framing / convergent interpretation, reframing / divergent
interpretation, and strength / weakness diagnosis, and summarizing lessons learned, which
consists of accommodation and integration. For figures depicting Burke et al.’s (2006) and
Rosen et al.’s (2011) models, see Appendices B and C, respectively. Each of the four phases and
all the sub-process behaviors from these models are described as key in allowing a team to face
and overcome changes and challenges.
Each of the behavioral processes of adaptation as described in the models above are
noted to facilitate team resilience. This is likely because both adaptation and resilience are
prompted by a change. That said, it is important to note that a trigger for team adaptation might
not also be a trigger for resilience; triggers for resilience are prompted by adverse change, a
trigger, or challenge. However, literature suggests that triggers for resilience require adaptation
as a response. The behavioral processes of adaptation as described in the models above facilitate
team resilience as follows: the phases of situation assessment and plan formulation provide goaloriented direction; the processes within plan implementation enable response to adverse triggers;
and team learning facilitates long-term team growth (Burke et al., 2006). Furthermore, Kennedy
et al. (2016) note that team resilience is salient in team adaptation, and this study considers that
the reverse is true as well. The two constructs are so intertwined, in fact, that in a series of
studies on team resilience in athletes, Morgan, Fletcher, and Sarkar (2013; 2015; 2017) define
team resilience as the positive adaptation of a team. Bowers et al. (2017) attempt to disentangle
the two constructs with the distinction that adaptability is a response to novel stimuli, while
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resilience is a response to adverse stimuli. That is to say, the relationship as described by Bowers
et al. (2017) suggests that all resilience requires adaptation, but not all adaptation results in
resilience.
This study is interested in the adaptive behavioral processes engaged in by resilient
teams. Specifically, resilient teams will be examined for the degree to which the following
behaviors are witnessed in response to a triggering stressful event: coordination, mutual
monitoring, systems monitoring, communication, backup, and conflict management. These
behaviors were chosen as they represent those action and interpersonal processes which are
identified by Marks et al. (2001) and overlap with recent models of team adaptation (Burke et al.,
2006; Rosen et al., 2001). Due to the nature of events and sources as discussed in the methods
section below, transition phase processes and the interpersonal process of affect management are
not examined. As such, Hypothesis 1 is stated as follows:
H1. Teams who demonstrate resilience will engage in adaptive process behaviors, such as
coordination, mutual monitoring, systems monitoring, communication, backup, and
conflict management.
The Triggers of Team Adaptation
In their synthesis and framework for team adaptation, Maynard and Kennedy (2016) note
the importance of trigger type on the adaptation process. Building upon previous understanding
of team processes as either taskwork or teamwork (e.g. Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, &
Milanovich, 1999), they dichotomize triggers as being either taskwork- or teamwork-focused.
Specifically, taskwork-focused triggers are described as those which hinder “what the team is
doing,” including interactions with tasks, tools, machines, and systems (Maynard & Kennedy,
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2016, p. 660). Similarly, teamwork-focused triggers are described as those which hinder “the
means by which the team accomplishes its task by doing it with each other” (Maynard &
Kennedy, 2016, p. 660). The type of trigger, they propose, instructs which type of adaptive
behaviors on which the team focuses their efforts. Echoing the propositions made by Maynard et
al. (2015), this study explores this relationship between trigger type and adaptive behavioral
process. Specifically, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are stated as follows:
H2. Taskwork-based triggers more frequently result in action phase processes of
adaptation, such as coordination, mutual monitoring, systems monitoring, and backup, as
compared to interpersonal processes.
H3. Teamwork-based triggers more frequently result in interpersonal processes to aid
adaptation, such as conflict management, as compared to action phase processes.
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METHOD
Historiometry
In order to test the above hypotheses, this research relies on historiometric analysis
(HMA). Historiometry is the systematic analysis of the content of past events through review and
coding of narrative historical sources—that is, previously published media documenting
historical persons and events, such as biographies, periodicals, and written histories. Crayne and
Hunter (2018) argue that this method is especially useful for organizational sciences in
particular, because it allows researchers to convert historical content into numerical data that
might be analyzed statistically. The usefulness of this method is further amplified when unique
or rare data samples, context and situational specifics, and/or longitudinal data are examined
(Crayne & Hunter, 2018). In a recent study on team leadership using this methodology, Burke et
al. (2018) note that historiometry is particularly useful when exploring relatively new constructs
which have not be thoroughly examined or understood, and further suggest that historiometry
offers the benefits of “contextual richness of the data and the corresponding external validity” (p.
8). Though traditionally more prominent in social psychology literature, recent studies have
relied on inductive, qualitative methods like HMA in industrial / organizational psychology and
related fields. Specifically, HMA has been used to review the topics of group-level impacts on
leadership, multi-team systems (MTSs), team leadership, and team adaptation (Mumford et al.,
2008; DeChurch et al., 2011; Resick, Randall, & DeChurch, 2011; Parry, Mumford, Bower, &
Watts, 2014; Burke et al., 2018), all of which closely relate to team resilience. Additionally,
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similar qualitative methods have been used to successfully study team resilience in particular
(Morgan et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2015, Morgan et al., 2017).
Critical Incident Technique
Mirroring the method used by Burke et al. (2018), this study also employs the critical
incident technique in order to ensure systematic extraction of relevant information from the
archival data sources. Each critical incident contains several parts: (1) the trigger which initiates
an adaptive response, (2) the behavioral response employed as a result of the trigger, and (3) the
consequence of the action as recorded in the archival source material. Breaking the critical
incidents down in this manner allowed for examination of the degree to which each team was
able to either maintain or bounce back their performance levels after encountering the trigger
(i.e. evidence for resilience). As described in the procedure below, the critical incidents are
structured to allow the components (trigger and behaviors) to be coded for analysis of the
hypotheses.
Events
For this study, HMA is used to examine the events of the 2014-2015 Volvo Ocean Races
and the behaviors of the teams of sailors who competed in them. This event was chosen based on
the availability of detailed documentation on the behaviors of the team members as they
competed, which is due to high publicity of the event and its recency. Furthermore, this event is
ideal, as it includes environments and circumstances in which the crews frequently experience a
need for adaptation and resilience in response to the many, varied stressors inherent in this
context (i.e. variable wave and wind conditions, extreme variations in temperature, crew illness
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and injury, equipment breakage, capsizing, hull damage). Finally, this race year in particular has
been chosen due to a change in the race format to implement the role of a designated media
person on each team, which facilitates the availability of information and documentation of team
behaviors during the race. This documentation and information is spread over various sources,
including news articles, official race reports, and web blogs written by team members during the
race.
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PROCEDURE
In a recent review, Crayne and Hunter (2018) outline the details of the HMA process,
broken down into key steps and sub-step actions that should be taken (see Appendix D for steps
as detailed by Crayne and Hunter, 2018). These are detailed and summarized below to include
the actions taken for each step.
Definition of Constructs and Research Questions
The constructs and research questions were defined as outlined and discussed above. Per
recommendations by Parry et al. (2014), the constructs have not only been defined, but specified
to a level of detail that allows for thorough investigation of specific phenomena. That is, this
research is not simply examining the relationships between team adaptation and team resilience
at a high level, but rather, it is specifically looking at the behavioral processes of team adaptation
demonstrated by extreme teams who engage in behaviors indicative of a state of resilience during
participation in the 2014-2015 Volvo Ocean Race. To this end, an extensive literature review
was conducted on the key construct of team resilience, and an annotated bibliography was
written to summarize the key articles and determine a state-of-the-literature within this domain.
A literature review was also conducted for the construct of team adaptation. Finally, searches
were conducted to gather available resources pertaining to the chosen events.
Investigative Piloting
Investigative piloting was conducted such that key documents relating to the chosen
events were reviewed to ensure that the constructs from the research questions were present and
extractable. Specifically, the author read and reviewed source material pertaining to the Volvo
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Ocean Races in a case analysis-type review, including Mundle’s (2002) chronicle of the 20012002 race, Ocean Warriors, and the Volvo Ocean Race website historical records, including
blogs written by and videos of the teams (VolvoOceanRacing.com). Potential narratives in the
form of critical incidents were gathered from each of these documents to serve as initial proof of
concept and examples of various types of triggers and adaptive behavioral processes contained
within them. For an example of this proof of concept and the form used to record these critical
incidents, see Appendix E. This stage of investigative piloting also served to inform decisions on
how this information might be coded to determine the levels of adaptation and resilience
demonstrated by the teams.
Decision of Data Structure
A format for gathering critical incidents was chosen (see Appendix E). This format
follows the guidelines set forth for critical incidents by Flanagan (1954), specifically in that they
include context, content, and consequences related to the phenomena of interest. However, this
format was further developed and tailored to the specific needs of this study such that each
critical incident includes the following components: relevant contextual information; a
description of the trigger initiating the critical incident; a description of the action taken by the
team in response to the trigger; a description of the consequences of the team’s actions;
identification of the relevant goal which is the trigger prohibiting reaching; a summary of the
critical incident; and a list of the specific sources used to draft it.
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Prototyping and Codebook Drafting
While the coding of the behavioral responses was bottom up, a codebook was developed
for the delineation of trigger types. This codebook integrated work by Maynard and Kennedy
(2016) with that of Alliger et al. (2015) to delineate trigger types and examples of them. The
trigger types indicated team challenges which cue a need for resilience as argued by Alliger et al.
(2015). These triggers were further classified as either teamwork- or taskwork-focused triggers
guided by Maynard and Kennedy (2016). The last step was to operationalize these triggers
within the context of long duration ocean racing events. The results can be seen in Appendix F.
Data Source and Collection Refinement
The sources from which data was collected were finalized to include published and
publicly available works detailing the events of the 2014-2015 Volvo Ocean Race and the
behaviors of the teams and individuals who competed in it. The criteria for choosing these
sources follows recommendations by Parry et al. (2014) concerning historiometric analysis
processes: namely, varied source types have been chosen, to ensure the generality of conclusions
drawn that might otherwise be impacted by the limited levels of quality, relevance, context,
objectivity, or biases presented by a single source. As mentioned, these include the Volvo Ocean
Race website historical records (VolvoOceanRacing.com), specifically two different types of
sources: (1) twice daily watchlogs, which are official race reports detailing the positions and
speeds of the boats and major events of the past 12 hours or so in the race, and (2) daily crew
diaries, which are journals recording the teams’ events, attitudes, and behaviors over the past
day. The watchlogs are written by unidentified, official race personnel, and the crew diaries are
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written by the assigned media person for each team, called an onboard reporter (OBR), as well as
occasional guest writers including other crew members and the skipper or leader of the sailing
team.
Event and Chapter Selection and Dissemination
Specific selections from the data sources described above were chosen and pulled using
quotes from the original diaries and watchlogs into the critical incident format as discussed
above and exemplified in Appendix E. The original source materials from the Volvo Ocean Race
website were saved from the website and stored electronically on a database accessible by all
participating coders.
Coder Training
Coders included a total of five subject matter experts (SMEs), arranged into two sets: one
set extracted critical incidents from the source material (extraction team) and a second set was
responsible for the actual coding of the extracted critical incidents (coding team). The extraction
team consisted a team of two research assistants as well as the author, all of whom are graduatelevel industrial / organizational psychology students with experience in teams research. The
coding team consisted of two senior researchers, both of whom are practicing industrial /
organizational psychologists specializing in teams research.
The extraction team was thoroughly trained on the critical incident technique as well as
the specific format developed and used for this study. This training consisted of learning about
the critical incident technique as well as how to apply it within the context of this study. Next,
members of the extraction team engaged in a practice round where they each assembled sets of
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critical incidents and received iterative feedback as to the quality of the incident pulled. This
process continued until the lead researcher was satisfied that the extracted incidents contained
the needed elements in the right amount of detail and were being pulled in a similar manner
across the extraction team.
The training of the coding team involved a slightly different process. Both coders have
extensive experience in the coding of adaptive team behaviors across a number of similar
contexts, so they already had a thorough understanding of team behavior and adaptation
processes. This combined with the emergent, bottom up nature of the coding led to the members
of the coding team not having a formally defined training process. In essence, they were guided
by their prior knowledge in the area, as well as the use of the trigger coding document that was
created as discussed above (see Appendix F). Moreover, while each member of the coding team
coded all critical incidents independently, all critical incidents were double coded with any
discrepancies resolved in consensus meetings.
Protocol Execution and Managing Coder Fatigue
Execution began with the pulling of critical incidents from the source material by trained
coders. Each critical incident was built from quotes from the chosen sources, as well as
paraphrasing and summaries of the events and behaviors of the team. After each critical incident
was pulled from the source material, it went through a quality control review by the author to
ensure that all relevant information was pulled from the original source material and that the
pulled quotes were placed in the correct category in the critical incident format.
The critical incidents were then used by coders to identify trigger type as either taskworkor teamwork-related and to specify the behavioral response(s) to the trigger within each incident.
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If the behavioral response to a specified trigger reflected more than a single behavior, all
behaviors were captured. Coders went through critical incidents by team. That is, coders coded
all critical incidents for a single sailing team at a time. This served to ensure that coders have the
maximum available context when coding each critical incident, as well as to minimize cognitive
load and coder fatigue. At the conclusion of coding, the coding team met for consensus meetings
to resolve any discrepancies in coding.
During the coding process, a total of 136 critical incidents were pulled from the source
material for six teams, giving an approximate average of 23 critical incidents per team. See Table
1 for a breakdown by team.
Table 1
Count of Critical Incidents by Race Team
Team Name

Number of CIs

Team Alvimedica

33

Team SCA

30

Team Brunel

27

Dongfeng Race Team

20

MAPFRE

17

Team Vestas Wind

9

Data Analysis
To examine Hypothesis 1, the coding of behavioral responses to triggers for resilience
was examined to determine the behavioral adaptive processes enacted by teams who
demonstrated resilience. To analyze this data, the frequency with which each behavior was
witnessed was rank ordered to provide further insight into those behaviors which most
commonly characterize resilient teams. Furthermore, the frequency of behaviors witnessed was
rank ordered for each team that was coded in order to provide insight in to the level to which
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each behavior is used by each team. To examine Hypotheses 2 and 3, behavioral responses to
taskwork- and teamwork-focused triggers were similarly examined to determine the behavioral
adaptive processes enacted by teams who demonstrate resilience in response to different types of
triggers. Again, the frequency with which these appeared in the source material was rank ordered
to provide insight into which behaviors are most commonly enacted in response to specific
trigger types by resilient teams.
To conduct these analyses, this study considers the conceptualization of team resilience
as an emergent state which is an outgrowth of teams engaging in adaptive processes in response
to a trigger event. To examine the degree to which each of the Volvo Ocean Race teams were
resilient to the atypical trigger events presented during the course of the race, this research
examines how each team was able to “bounce back” their performance levels following trigger
events. This bouncing back is operationalized by examining the longitudinal trend of responses
and the degree to which the teams’ subsequent actions facilitated their ability to bounce back
across a series of events. In essence, in order to say that a team is demonstrating the state of
resilience, the team must have, over time, been able to “withstand and overcome stressors in a
manner that enables sustained performance” (Alliger et al., 2015, p. 176) and/or “…cope,
recover and adjust positively to difficulties” (Carmeli et al, 2013, p. 149). This can be seen at a
high level in these teams by examining their placement at the end of each leg. More specifically,
a team that is resilient is one who is able to sustain its performance levels despite significant
adversity (i.e. the atypical triggers encountered these extreme contexts) and, in so doing, would
consistently finish the race towards the top place across race legs. Alternatively, taking the view
of resilience as the capacity to bounce back, resilience may be evidenced by a team faltering in
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one leg, but recovering its performance capacity, as evidenced by race placement in this case,
within a subsequent leg. Using this operationalization, the six teams included in the present
analyses could all be argued to be resilient, with most of the resilience witnessed by bouncing
back in performance levels following various triggers. Few instances are seen where a single
team remains in the lead throughout a single leg of the race, much less the entire race.
Additionally, while teams may not always be successful in their immediate behavioral response
to a trigger within each of the race legs, the teams do ultimately recover their performance level
and maintain a consistent note of optimism and persistence even in the face of extreme
challenges.
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RESULTS
Results indicated partial support for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, teams that demonstrated
resilience were found to respond to challenges (i.e. triggers) by engaging in some of the
hypothesized adaptive behaviors, including coordination, monitoring, and backup, as reflected in
the Marks et al. (2001) framework. It should be noted that monitoring was coded singularly,
rather than separated into mutual monitoring and systems monitoring; however after review, it
was determined that nearly all instances of monitoring were systems monitoring. Additionally,
no instances of conflict management emerged in response to triggers for team resilience. In
conjunction with the hypothesized behaviors, eleven other behaviors were found to be enacted in
response to the taskwork and teamwork triggers: problem solving, endurance, leadership / leader
mobilization, boundary spanning, team care, entrainment, risk taking, interpersonal support,
maximizing available resources, vigilance, and team mobilization.
Additionally, rank ordering of the frequency of occurrence indicates that coordination,
problem solving, endurance, monitoring, backup, and team care were the most commonly seen
behavioral responses, accounting for 79.8% of the total behavioral responses witnessed (see
Table 2). These behaviors highlight the importance of not turning inward during stressful events,
but capitalizing on the strength of the entire team (e.g. coordination, backup). These also
highlight the importance of attention not only to the more typical team behaviors, but also the
importance of those behaviors which foster wellbeing (e.g. team care). Table 2 contains the full
list of adaptive behaviors witnessed, rank ordered based on frequency counts and percentage of
total behaviors witnessed, as well as a description of the behavioral adaptive process and a
contextualized example of each as witnessed in the critical incidents.
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Table 2
Rank Ordered Frequency of Behavioral Adaptive Processes Witnessed
Rank Adaptive Process Freq. Percent Description

1

Coordination*

60

26.3%

Contextualized Example(s)

"Orchestrating the sequence and
timing of interdependent actions"
(Marks et al., 2001, p. 363)

“On my last watch we just did the most horrible of all the sail changes
you have to do: the J1 to J2 change, a really, really hard job requiring the
whole team on the bow to wrestle the J1 down into its bag and off the
foredeck” (SCA-11)
“We tried rebooting the whole system twice and fortunately, after the
second time, the gremlin left the boat and we were safe.” (SCA-10)

2

3

Problem solving

Endurance

47

30

20.6%

Engaging in analytic and diagnostic
behaviors to better understand and
combat difficult or complex issues

“The sea state was still rather rough so we started from the bottom up,
problem solving.” (TVW-01)

13.2%

Persistent, continued goal-directed
action

“It seems hourly we need to bail this giant sieve of seawater, it’s coming
in from parts we didn’t even know we had. This job is exhausting but
necessary….” (TVW-04)

Monitoring of system resources to
include the equipment, task, and
team

“We are getting ready for tough sailing conditions, we checked the mast
and the winches....” (MAPFRE-04)

9.2%
4

Monitoring*
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“…the crew off-watch was up on deck within a few minutes to help out
and save the situation.” (SCA-14)

5

Backup*

12

5

Team care

12

6

Leadership / leader
mobilization

9

5.3%

Assisting team members in
performing their tasks (can be
behavioral or informational)

“Xabi and Jean Luc are standing in for him and doing a great job.”
(MAPFRE-09)

5.3%

Behaviors which foster the physical
health of the team

“Ñeti took wonderful care of me, and together with Pablo, the race’s
doctor, they helped me recover really quickly,” he says.” (MAPFRE-09)

3.9%

Actions which involve direct
guidance or immediate, directive
calls to action

“The call to go on deck came loud and clear and the situation was under
control again within a few minutes.” (MAPFRE-07)
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Rank Adaptive Process Freq. Percent Description

Contextualized Example(s)

7

Boundary spanning

8

3.5%

Communicating and coordinating
with entities outside the team

“Within minutes, Nicholson alerted race control in Alicante, Spain.”
(VW-07)

8

Entrainment

7

3.1%

Member synchronization (i.e. team
rhythm)

“…as boring as staying on one tack for a week can be, it really helps with
routines and rhythms….” (TA-07)
“Routing agrees on tacking up the coast of Luzon (that will be fun), so
for now the brief is simple: go east until the wind begins to shift from the
coast” (TA-21)

9

Communication*

6

2.6%

Clear, concise exchange of
information

“At least one of the crew had to watch and call the waves all the time so
others could brace as the water broke on to the boat.” (VW-07)
““It’s a long leg and this will undoubtedly change, it’s a big casino,” says
Jean Luc, with a cheery tone in his voice to lift our spirits.” (MAPFRE13)

10

11

12

Interpersonal
support

Risk taking

Maximizing
available resources

5

Behaviors which serve to foster the
psychosocial health of the team (e.g.
motivational, morale building)
“We’re encouraging each other and pushing hard....” (MAPFRE-17)

4

Engaging in behaviors and strategies “This time the manoeuvre is much more risky for there’s a man in the
which involve an element of
water, the sea is slightly wavy, and we have 17 knots wind.” (MAPFREcalculated risk or are not the norm
08)

2.2%

1.8%

“We’re now sailing with the J3 (staysail). It’s OK for now but we’re
going to miss the J2.” (BRUN-27)

3

Making use of the resources
available with the recognition that
the use may not be optimal and
continuing to strive to move beyond
the satisficed decision

““Quick! They’re not looking,” jokes our navigator Capey but in fact the
young Belgian does take advantage of a moment’s inattention by the
Spaniards to slide ahead of them.” (TBRUN-25)
“The guys who were off watch jumped up and stormed on deck, just
feeling that something was not right.” (TBRUN-13)

1.3%

13

Vigilance

2

0.9%

Sustained, continual monitoring of
environment and resources

14

Team mobilization

2

0.9%

Team member self-initiated calls to
quick action

*Processes hypothesized based on Marks et al. (2001) framework
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To ensure that any one team was not skewing results and that the behaviors witnessed in
the teams’ behavioral responses were fairly balanced amongst the observed teams, the witnessed
behaviors were listed for frequency and rank ordered by team. As such, Table 3 contains the
frequency of each adaptive behavior witnessed by each team. The top three ranked behaviors—
namely coordination, problem solving, and endurance—were all witnessed in all teams. The
subsequent three behaviors—namely monitoring, backup, and team care—were witnessed in all
but one team. The remaining nine behaviors that were witnessed were seen less frequently or
with less even spread amongst the teams. This may be due to the factors specific to the
methodology or source material from which the data was pulled, as further discussed in the
limitations. As such, this points to the strongest evidence for the top six adaptive behaviors
witnessed as being most important for teams who frequently demonstrate resilience.
It should be noted that the rank order of behaviors witnessed shows slight variation
between Table 2 above and Table 3 below. This is due to the fact that some critical incidents
were coded for multiple trigger sub-types. For example, a single critical incident may have both
a challenging condition trigger, such as extreme heat, as well as a crisis event trigger, such as a
broken water maker. In this case, a response of the adaptive behavior or endurance to each event
would be counted once in Table 2 and twice in Table 3.
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Table 3
Rank Ordered Frequency of Behavioral Adaptive Processes Witnessed by Race Team

Endurance

Monitoring

Backup

Team Care

Leadership

Entrainment

Boundary
Spanning

Interpersonal
Support

Risk Taking

Communication

Vigilance

7

3

9

4

1

3

0

5

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

SCA

15

5

5

6

5

1

2

1

0

1

2

0

1

0

0

Brunel

6

7

1

3

1

3

2

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

Dongfeng

5

11

2

3

1

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

MAPFRE

11

8

3

0

3

2

2

0

2

2

1

0

0

0

0

Vestas Wind

5

4

2

2

0

0

1

0

2

0

0

2

0

0

0

Team
Mobilization

Problem Solving

Alvimedica

Team Name

Maximizing
Available
Resources

Coordination

Adaptive Process

An examination of the frequency of behaviors within the action phase portion of
teamwork in conjunction with the types of triggers which cued their enactment suggest support
for Hypothesis 2. That is, taskwork-based triggers more frequently resulted in action phase
processes of adaptation—namely, coordination, monitoring, and backup—as compared to
interpersonal processes. A total of 201 taskwork-based triggers were coded in the critical
incidents. Of these, 191 were responded to with an action phase behavioral process of adaptation.
In contrast, 10 were responded to with interpersonal processes. The most frequent behavioral
responses to taskwork-based triggers were coordination, problem solving, endurance,
monitoring, and backup. Behaviors including leader mobilization, boundary spanning, team care,
entrainment, and communication were also commonly seen, but less so than the first set
previously mentioned. Finally, in terms of rank ordered frequency of occurrence, behaviors
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including risk taking, interpersonal support, maximizing available resources, vigilance, and team
mobilization were seen least often. In Table 3, the full list of action phase processes coded in
response to taskwork-based triggers listed, rank ordered by frequency witnessed in the critical
incidents.
Table 4
Rank Ordered Frequency of Action Phase and Emergent Behavioral Adaptive Processes
Witnessed in Response to Taskwork-Based Triggers
Rank Adaptive Process

Freq.

Phase

1

Coordination*

59

Action

2

Problem solving

43

Action

3

Endurance

25

Action

4

Monitoring*

17

Action

5

Backup*

10

Action

6

Leadership / leader mobilization

8

Action

6

Boundary spanning

8

Action

7

Team care

6

Interpersonal

8

Entrainment

5

Action

8

Communication

5

Action

9

Risk taking

4

Action

9

Interpersonal support

4

Interpersonal

10

Maximizing available resources

3

Action

11

Vigilance

2

Action

11

Team mobilization

2

Action

*Processes hypothesized based on Marks et al. (2001) framework

The results, although tentative, do not suggest support for Hypothesis 3. In examining the
frequency with which teamwork-focused triggers engendered interpersonal versus action phase
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adaptive behaviors, results indicated that action phase behaviors were seen more often (15 and 6
occurrences, respectively). However, due to the overall low number of teamwork triggers found
within the sample, this result is tentative, and no solid conclusions should be drawn. This result
was particularly surprising and may be due to the highly visible nature of the source material
used as further discussed in the later limitation section. In Table 4, the full list of processes coded
in response to taskwork-based triggers listed, rank ordered by frequency witnessed in the critical
incidents.
Table 5
Rank Ordered Frequency of Interpersonal Phase and Emergent Behavioral Adaptive Processes
Witnessed in Response to Teamwork-Based Triggers
Rank Adaptive Process

Freq.

Phase

1

Team care

5

Interpersonal

1

Endurance

5

Action

2

Problem solving

2

Action

2

Monitoring

2

Action

2

Backup

2

Action

3

Interpersonal support

1

Interpersonal

3

Coordination

1

Action

3

Leadership / leader mobilization

1

Action

3

Entrainment

1

Action

3

Communication

1

Action
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DISCUSSION
Implications
The current study represents a bottom-up, emergent approach to understanding the set of
behavioral processes that characterize resilient teams as they respond to taskwork and teamworkbased triggers. In this vein, as predicted, many of the behaviors which have been listed in
prominent teamwork models serve as the mechanisms by which resilient teams respond to
triggers necessitating a need for adaptation and resilience. In addition to those behaviors
hypothesized to fostered the ability to adapt, as well as the later corresponding resilience, were
found, some of which are not commonly seen in prominent team taxonomies (namely problem
solving, endurance, leader mobilization, boundary spanning, team care, entrainment, risk taking,
interpersonal support, maximizing available resources, vigilance, and team mobilization).
Specifically, the top behaviors seen were coordination, problem solving, endurance, monitoring,
backup and team care. Furthermore, these same top behaviors were seen most evenly across all
or most teams, giving the strongest evidence for their importance to teams who frequently adapt
and display resilience in response to triggers.
The study also begins to expand work by Maynard et al. (2015) by further investigating
the impact of trigger type (taskwork versus teamwork) on the adaptive behavioral responses. In
the study, trigger type was captured as well as the specific type of action phase or interpersonal
behavioral response. As argued in the analysis section above, all teams could be argued to be
resilient over the course of the race in that they either maintain or bounce back their performance
levels following the triggers they face either immediately following them or across race legs.
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Due to this, the results provide insight into not only the relationship between trigger type and
category of behavioral response, but also into the types of behavioral responses used by teams
that foster resilience. That is, though the results do not speak to the differences between resilient
and non-resilient teams, they begin to suggest a set of adaptive behavioral processes that are
engaged in by resilient teams based on the descriptions put forth in the literature (e.g. Carmeli et
al, 2013; Alliger et al., 2015). Additionally, the results speak to the specific types of behaviors
that are seen in response to task and teamwork triggers.
An unexpected finding that emerged was the less frequent presence of teamwork-focused
triggers as compared to taskwork-focused triggers. As the literature has often shown that a team
of experts does not equate to an expert team, it was a welcome surprise to find a set of teams
that, upon further digging into compositional aspects, were found to not only be task experts, but
also seem to have high levels of generalized team skills. Thereby, many of the challenges that
often serve as teamwork triggers seem to have appeared to a lesser extent, though additional
potential explanations are identified in the subsequent limitations. Future work on the larger
project from which this study originated will be able examine teams with lower skill levels, both
as it relates to taskwork and teamwork, which will serve to begin to investigate to what degree
the fewer number of teamwork triggers is a function of the context (i.e. extreme ocean racing) or
experience level of the team.
Limitations
Like all studies, this one has limitations. A primary limitation of this study is that it
considers a single type of team: elite, extreme teams who frequently display resilience. These
teams and the members that comprise them are highly skilled and experienced in their sport.
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They frequently face various challenges or triggers and respond with adaptive behaviors and
rebounds in performance that are indicative of resilience. The results found may not hold to less
skilled teams in these same contexts. Furthermore, this study is limited in how thoroughly it can
speak to teams who are resilient, because it does not offer comparison to teams who frequently
fail to show adaptation or resilience in the face of triggers. However, this study is a part of a
larger project funded by the Army Research Institute, which is considering amateur teams, who
participate in the Clipper Round the World Race, alongside expert teams from the Volvo Ocean
Race. Like the Volvo Ocean Race, this competition consists of a single-boat, round-the-world
sailboat race in which many teams race over the course of 9 months, split into 9 or more race
legs. This larger project’s study may have further implications and insight on the adaptive
behavioral processes for teams with lower levels of taskwork-specific and generalized teamwork
skills in this context. Furthermore, as the teams examined in this larger project are comprised
largely of amateur sailors with low levels of taskwork and teamwork skills, they are not expected
to adapt or recover their performance levels in the face of triggers (i.e. demonstrate resilience) as
frequently or well as the teams from the Volvo Ocean Race.
Additionally, as with all studies, the types of teams studied form boundary conditions for
the results. Therefore, it is expected that the results presented herein best apply to extreme teams
as defined by Bell et al. (2016): those who (a) complete their tasks in performance environments
with one or more contextual features that are atypical in level (e.g. extreme time pressure) or
kind (e.g. confinement, danger) and (b) for which ineffective performance has serious
consequences. That is, the findings may hold for elite military personnel, astronauts, wildland
firefighters, or other teams with high skill level who operate in intense, dynamic contexts under
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the pressure of extreme consequences, often life or death. They may also be most applicable to
extreme teams who are predominantly intact in their membership and where members have a
high level of task-based experience.
As previously mentioned, this study has a particularly low rate of capture of teamworkbased triggers; so much so that Hypothesis 3 was found inconclusive. As mentioned, the reason
for the lack of teamwork triggers is not clear. While the use of source material produced
immediately following the teams action reduces the potential impact of hindsight bias, it also
introduces its own set of limitations. Though it may be that these elite teams did not experience a
high level of teamwork triggers, a more likely case based on teams literature is that the low rate
of appearance of teamwork triggers is a function of other factors. For example, one possibility is
a positive framing bias due to the high visibility of the team’s output, whether in terms of
performance or crew diary documentation, which may have lead members to choose to not
highlight interpersonal issues. This is especially likely due to the a second related factor – the
small community of long distance ocean racing sailors, which increases the likelihood that
members will work together again after the race. Additionally, because the crew diaries were
written soon after the events which they described, the authors may have been disinclined to
describe negative occurrences to maintain positive morale on the team, specifically in regards to
teamwork focused triggers such as conflict. Similarly, a positive framing bias might also have
come from the fact that the source material consisted of public facing documents meant to garner
further interest by the public in the race and its events.
Further study, possibly even the larger project mentioned, may serve to begin to answer
these limitations. That is, because the larger project includes amateur teams who are supposed to
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be less likely to display the behaviors associated with adaptation and correlated resilience, they
may also be more likely to display or discuss teamwork focused triggers. This may be either or
both because they experience more teamwork focused triggers or because they are less aware of
how to or less able to screen out teamwork focused triggers in the public facing source material.
As such, this comparison many significantly further the research directions begun in this study.
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CONCLUSION
As focus on the importance of team research continues, the importance of team resilience
and adaptation continue as well. This study serves to begin to break apart the specifics of what
team resilience is, how team adaptation leads to team resilience, and what specific behavioral
processes enable team resilience. Though this study works within a specific type of team (i.e.
elite, extreme teams) in a specific context (i.e. ocean racing), it may well have implications for
other types of extreme teams. Furthermore, this study may serve as a springboard for further
research to continue to look into the specifics of these processes as well as continue to examine
them through other, varied methods.
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APPENDIX A: MARKS ET AL.’S (2001) MANIFESTATION OF PROCESSES IN
TRANSITION AND ACTION PHASES
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Note: The 3 bottom-most processes are interpersonal processes and occur during both transition
and action phases, as indicated.
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APPENDIX B: BURKE ET AL.’S (2006) MODEL OF ADAPTIVE TEAM
PERFORMANCE

38

39

APPENDIX C: ROSEN ET AL.’S (2011) EXPANDED FRAMEWORK OF TEAM
ADAPTATION
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APPENDIX D: CRAYNE AND HUNTER’S (2018) STEPS AND SUBSTEPS FOR
HISTORIOMETRIC ANALYSIS
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Steps

Substeps

1. Definition of constructs and research
questions

a. Develop theory and hypotheses through
extensive literature review
b. Operationalize constructs of interest
through theory and / or the use of previously
validated construct measures
a. Primary investigator engages in a “proof of
concept” exploration of the research
landscape via case analysis

2. Investigative piloting

b. Acquire a small set of potential narratives
and use them to demonstrate that phenomena
of interest are likely to be identified in such
content
3. Decision of data structure

a. Determine how the how the data captured
through content analysis should be structured
b. Establish how constructs or relationships of
interest are best captured - choose an “eventbased” or “chapter-based” perspective
c. Determine whether the study is to approach
data from a within-subjects or betweensubjects design, or some combination
d. Identify a method for capturing criterion
variables

4. Prototyping and codebook drafting

a. Develop a codebook that reflects the
intended data structure and identifies
predictor, control, and outcome variables
b. Engage the research team in piloting to
establish operational benchmarks, which
examples for low, medium, and high levels of
target constructs and phenomena

5. Data source and collection refinement

a. Use the coding strategy established during
codebook development and information
collected during piloting to identify and
acquire data sources
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b. Review the selected content and make
assessments of potential author biases,
information completeness, sourcing, and
consistency
6. Event / chapter selection and dissemination

a. Research team reviews the research
materials and identifies content that is likely
to be relevant to the research effort and
eliminate content which is irrelevant
b. Develop a plan for disseminating the
selected content to the research team, and for
storing any research materials

7. Coder training

a. Familiarize the rating team with the goals
and objectives of the research, as well as the
codebook
b. Conduct pilot tests to develop socialized
mental models within the team, whereby team
members engage in discussion over materials
to come to mutual agreement and consistency
c. Engage in meetings with the rating team in
order to maintain consistent perspectives on
the materials and processes, as well as address
specific questions or concerns

8. Protocol execution and managing coder
fatigue

a. Establish a coding framework so that coders
know how to progress through research
materials and record data efficiently
b. Organize materials such that coders are not
constantly grouped together
c. Remain vigilant for signals of coder fatigue
or judgmental lapses. Check in with coding
team directly, as well as look for statistical
indicators of inconsistency

9. Data analysis

a. Organize final dataset and conduct
statistical analyses necessary for hypothesis
testing
a. Assess the results of statistical analyses as
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10. Integrating quantitative values with
qualitative data

they relate to both predictions and existing
theory and research
b. Look for opportunities to illustrate findings
or support theory through the story-telling
ability of the narratives
c. Consider revisiting data sources in search of
theoretically sound moderators, informing
future research
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APPENDIX E: EXAMPLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS
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Team#
CI#
Context
Trigger

Team SCA
SCA-01-JM
Leg One; Lack of wind
“Despite not having much wind, the night has been incredibly full on” October 12 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
Action
“‘We are sailing upwind and downwind, upwind and downwind,' Sophie
explained as she climbed back into her bunk. ‘This means we are constantly
maneuvering the boat on our way to the Atlantic; we are constantly tacking,
gybing, and setting new sails depending on the wind shifts.’ We have not had
much sleep, but we are in full on race mode now so sleep does not matter.” October 12 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
Consequence “The clock struck 0115 UTC and Libby downloaded the “scheds” (the
schedule, with all of the boat’s locations—only available every 6 hours). Her
sigh was audible around the boat. The team collectively hooted and hollered
for joy as Libby told us we were 21 nautical miles ahead of the fleet! Our risk
paid off big time and we are now officially sailing in the Atlantic Ocean!” October 13 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
Goal
Make gains despite a lack of wind
Summary
Team SCA encountered a lack of wind during the start of Leg One causing
inconsistent sailing. They adjusted their sailing strategy to suit the conditions
and were constantly tacking and gybing through the night. It paid off because
by the next day they had a lead of 21 nautical miles over the fleet.
Source
October 12 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
October 13 - Corinna Holloran, OBR

Team#
CI#
Context

Trigger

Action

Team SCA
SCA-02-JM
Leg One; A widely growing gap between Team SCA and the rest of the fleet
due to very slow sailing. “Forrest Gump once wisely said: "Life is like a box of
chocolates, you never know what you're gonna get." That could never be more
true than today. Except our chocolate got squished as well; it's still good, we
still love it, but it's just been a bit sticky and messy the last 24 hours.” October 29 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
“Last night, as we happily made our way southwest, we got caught under our
own personal rain cloud that sucked every ounce of wind. Our "parade" was
both literally and figuratively rained on. By morning, we were 90 miles behind
MAPFRE, and by 1pm, we were another 49 miles behind. Unsure if "gutted"
gives the best description of the mood of all of us on board - but it felt like we
had all been stabbed in the stomach.” - October 29 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
“Yes, today was not easy, but we did not allow ourselves to slow us down - we
sailed with the conditions given and sailed at 100% performance. So, as I've
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said before: don't rule us out. Don't expect anything but the best from us. Don't
stop believin'. There is still thousands of miles left, and with a newly added
"Ice Gate" in the Southern Ocean, the next couple of days racing may get even
closer. We are fighting and that's the most important part. After all, who knows
what chocolates we'll have tomorrow…” - October 29 - Corinna Holloran,
OBR
Consequence “We take one day at a time; each day is different—each hour is different. “The
rich will get richer at this point,” Libby said yesterday afternoon. And we all
felt like deflated balloons—the distance just kept growing! Yesterday
afternoon we couldn’t hit our performance numbers either—we had the best
sailors in the correct places and they all said the boat felt slow, but couldn’t
figure out why.
By late afternoon though, everything had changed. The wind picked up and
decided to stick around a bit longer than expected, waves began crashing over
the bow, and we were sailing fast. Everything felt a little better. Even the
position report didn’t sting as much.” - November 1 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
“The back of the pack (Team SCA, MAPFRE) were in 20 knots overnight,
making great bounding gains on the leaders.” - November 2 - 0630 UTC
Watchlog
Goal
Make gains despite very slow and unpredictable sailing conditions
Summary
Team SCA found themselves losing ground between themselves and the rest of
the fleet due to slow and unpredictable sailing conditions. Despite their losses
and the team being upset about their position, they chose to fight their best to
try and regain some position. After sailing in the slow conditions for several
days, they finally found some wind and were able to make gains on the leaders.
Source
October 29 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
November 1 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
November 2 - 0630 UTC Watchlog

Team#
CI#
Context
Trigger

Action

Team SCA
SCA-03-JM
Leg Two; Variable winds and sailing conditions
“We started the day off with nearly 28 knots of wind and waves crashing into
the cockpit. However, by mid-day the sails were flopping and the decks were
dry. Then, by the evening, the wind was back and we were hooning along back
with 20 knots of breeze. ” - November 22 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
“We are doing all that we can do with the stack—moving forward and aft quite
often. “When the wind is changing this much you just need to focus on keep
going. We’ve moved the stack quite a bit—internal and external, and made big
adjustments on the sails. So we’re pretty busy, constantly trying to keep the
speed going. So, it is a bit frustrating because you never know what’s going to
happen next, “ Annie said… But that’s life offshore—you never know exactly
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what you’re going to be handed by Mother Nature. And that’s why it is so
important to be ready for what the game throws at you. It’s also another reason
why it’s important to have a plan in place.” - November 22 - Corinna Holloran,
OBR
Consequence “Finally, at 1900 UTC, the fleet has regrouped, with the blue boat, Vestas, and
the magenta boat, SCA, still in the most southern position.
Speaking of them… SCA has gained 35nm since the last report, and Vestas,
42nm. Could their option have worked? “ - November 22 - 1915 UTC
Watchlog
Goal
Make gains despite variable winds (high to low to high) and rough seas
Summary
Team SCA encountered extremely variable winds -- with high winds in the
morning, almost no wind in the afternoon, and back to very high winds in the
evening -- along with rough seas. Their strategies to attempt for gains in these
conditions included moving the stack quite a bit—internal and external, and
making big adjustments on the sails. The team kept constantly busy, trying to
keep the speed going. Ultimately they were able to gain 35 nautical miles
within this sailing period despite these conditions.
Source
November 22 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
November 22 - 1915 UTC Watchlog

Team#
CI#
Context
Trigger

Team SCA
SCA-04-JM
Leg Two; Unpleasant conditions aboard, rough seas, exhaustion
“I’m not going to sugar coat it: the last few days have been tough—really
tough. I’m shocked I have kept my food down, but only with the help of meds
and choosing my editing time wisely—others have not been as lucky.
Waves catapult us into each other, the deck, deck hardware, and tangle us in
sheets. Add fighting constant exhaustion to the mix and life is far from
pleasant.”
Action
“A working body clock is vital out here. It’s a constant mind and body battle—
your mind knows it needs to work hard but your body can physically not or
visa versa. That’s why rhythms out here are so important—to help get your
body clock into sync. But getting into that rhythm this leg has not been easy.
Which ultimately leads us back to the importance of having trained for so long.
Our bodies needed to be ready to take on the relentless waves and lack of
sleep. However, even with all the training, it’s still a challenge for the first few
days as you trick your body clock into the schedule you need. And trust me, all
the will and want you can muster: if your body is exhausted your body still
usually wins. Hence the ridiculous spelling errors that must be strewed across
my last few blogs and photo captions.”
Consequence Enhanced team morale and positive affect in the face of difficult conditions.
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Goal
Summary

Source

“So we have to take the tough moments and the rough conditions to have the
best jobs in the world—it’s not a bad exchange. I knew this was the way life
should be when the sun was setting, the 3-meter waves were moving under us,
and at least four Albatross were dancing on the horizon. There was Dee, the
most experienced Southern Ocean sailor on the boat, smiling from ear to ear—
yep, this exhilaration, this awe, this appreciation, doesn’t get old!”
Attempt to make gains in unpleasant conditions (sea sickness, rough seas,
exhaustion)
Team SCA spoke of how unpleasant the conditions were on mind and body
while sailing through a particularly rough patch of seas. The crew experienced
sea sickness and a lack of sleep. The importance of rhythms was discussed;
they have to try and get their bodies into a sync in order to keep up with the
grueling pace. Despite these conditions, the crew describe their happiness and
awe at having the opportunity to sail in the Volvo Ocean Race.
November 23 - Corinna Holloran, OBR

Team#
CI#
Context

Team SCA
SCA-05-JM
Leg Two; J1 sail needing repairs “Before 0800 UTC the team was well into a
proper sail repair below decks and, above deck, the team was sailing fast and
hard.”
Trigger
“In the early morning hours, one of the sailors shone her light on to the front
sail, our J1, and noticed a few torn holes in the sail per result of the staysail’s
clew flapping hard against the J1.”
Action
“The team rode it out with the torn sail for a little while longer, until they had a
weather window sufficient enough to sail on the smaller (and incorrect) sail,
the J2.
After luging the sail down the deck and into the boat, Stacey and Abby started
to prepare the sail for repair. Both sailors were off watch and began using their
vital off watch hours to repair the sail, a job projected to take at least two
hours.
First, the sail needed to be dried, so the girls used the engine and acetone to dry
off the sail. Next, Stacey cut new pieces of 3Di sail for the repair and used
5200 to glue the patches to the sail. Finally, the sewing machine was brought
out to put the final touches on the repair. Two-hours and twenty minutes later
the sail was hoisted and SCA was on the correct sail again.
While the girls below deck fixed one of the more important sails for the leg,
the girls above deck were sailing incredibly well and fast.”
Consequence The sail was repaired below deck, while above deck the ladies sailed “well and
fast,” making fleet-wide gains despite the fact that they were sailing with their
smaller J2 sail.
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Goal
Summary

Source

“... the deck team’s performance was so on target that we were the fastest boat
in the fleet for the next position report. Furthermore, we made gains fleet wide,
miles that later in the day became essential for us. The important thing to note
here is that we were sailing on the smaller, incorrect sail.
What this morning proved was how Team SCA works as a team. Both Stacey
and Abby worked straight through their off watch time in order to better the
team’s overall performance. Both women did it without batting an eye; in fact
they both had smiles on their faces despite working straight for nearly 12 hours
once they finished their second watch.”
Continue sailing at a high speed despite using a smaller J2 sail while the
broken J1 sail was repaired
Team SCA had a broken J1 sail that took several hours to repair below deck.
During this time, the above deck crew successfully sailed the team at a fast
pace while running on the smaller J2 sail. In fact, during this time, they “were
the fastest boat in the fleet for the next position report” and “made gains fleet
wide.”
November 27 - Corinna Holloran, OBR
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APPENDIX F: TRIGGER TYPE CODEBOOK
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Common Challenges
[Triggers]

Examples

Source

Trigger
Type

“Crisis” events

Things breaking on the boat
Man overboard
Someone getting hurt / sick
Flooding onboard
Loss of food or other resources
Crashes
Team member washed overboard

Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork

Performance/Time pressure

Navigation around iceberg
Compressed racing

Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork

Insufficient resources

Running low on food / supplies

Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork

Challenging conditions

Change in environmental conditions
Lack of wind/high wind
Variation between high seas/normal seas
Extreme temperature
Constant wet environment - wet clothes,
supplies, etc.

Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork

Hazardous work

Cleaning the keel, rudder, and propeller (when
weeds get stuck and prevent full speed) while
the boat is still moving - entails one member
hanging over or swimming underneath the boat
and removing the weeds
Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork

Interpersonal conflicts within
team

Interpersonal conflict within team

Alliger et al. (2015) Teamwork

Team member out for a leg due to
Degradation of team resources / injury/illness Team member leaving during the
“Missing” team members (e.g. leg due to a death in the family
vacation, ill)
Team member fatality during the leg
Alliger et al. (2015) Teamwork

Poor results

At bottom of race standings at leg end
Backwards movement in doldrums or other
poor weather conditions
Tactic ended up not paying off
Crash requiring retirement from the leg
Went from a lead to a deficit in a short period of
time
Alliger et al. (2015) Taskwork
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